ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The study of Bayesian networks" is an important area of research in uncertain reasoning [21] with the potential for improving our understanding of learning, knowledge representation, and plausible inference in intelligence systems. Since probabilistic methods are epistemologically adequate to perform key patterns of human reasoning [7, 13] , a large potential for practical applications exists. Bayesian networks are particularly attractive for expert-system development, because computationally efficient probabilistic methods have been developed and implemented in commercial systems [18, 15] .
Despite these virtues, Bayesian networks are often criticized with regard to one crucial aspect [12, 23] : Exact probabilities connecting all relevant dependencies must be supplied to model an application domain. But most domains require reasoning techniques for coping with incomplete or imprecise information about the involved probabilities. In case of subjective information, where probabilities are acquired from an expert agent, intervals are quite common, e.g. "provided that player A recovers from his injury on time, the chance that team X wins over team Y in next Saturday's football match is 80 to 90 percent." On the other hand, objective probabilities require statistical sampling where the wanted probability can be derived only with some uncertainty; tighter intervals incur higher sampling costs in general. Therefore it is necessary to control how this uncertainty is accumulated while connecting several such uncertain statements within a deduction. Such knowledge can be represented suitably by probability inten~als which reflect bounds for probabilities. In this paper, a probability interval is described by an uncertain rule of the form U I U~ A -, B, which is interpreted as a range restriction for a conditional probability expression, i.e. u I _< P(B I A) < u 2. An advantage of this quasilogical formalism is that it offers a declarative representation of uncertain knowledge [1] . The degree of imprecision is reflected by the breadth of the interval [u~, u?] .
To date there are numerous publications on probability intervals and approximate reasoning techniques (e.g. [20, 2, 5, 3, 24] ). In contrast with these approaches, we will develop bounds propagation methods with the objective of both computational efficiency and precise bounds" calculation, allowing for meaningful explanations and automated sensitil,ity analyses. By systematic variation of the probability bounds we can analyze the sensitivity of the knowledge base. In particular it is important to identify the presence of chaotic behacior, where tiny changes in the input bounds will produce large changes in computed output bounds. Even if in the very end one intends to implement an application by conventional Bayesian net-works with exact probabilities, the use of intervals pays off in the delicate knowledge acquisition phase. The results of such a sensitivity analysis can be employed to substantially improve the robustness and reliability of Bayesian expert systems for decision analysis. It may even reduce sampling costs by predicting portions of the network that don't require very tight interval estimates. Of course, this ambitious goal can only be achieved under certain restrictions: We consider causal programs where the rules describe a singly connected network. We chose a rule-based approach because of the nice model-theoretic semantics of these logical programs, which will be based on a probability distribution with binary random variables.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces causal programs as a logical formalism for Bayesian networks with intervals. The bounds propagation methods for these programs are developed in Section 3. Then in Section 4 the main soundness, completeness, and efficiency results are given. We analyze the sensitivity of derived bounds in Section 5. The bounds propagation methods are extended to networks with multiple parents (polytrees) in Section 6. Section 7 discusses related work, and finally in Section 8 we summarize the results and outline future research.
CAUSAL PROGRAMS
Instead of a Bayesian network with exact probabilities and its usual graphical representation, we choose to develop our approach within a logical setting, continuing the work in [6] , [9] , and [27] . In the sequel we will introduce causal programs consisting of a set of rules where we use intervals rather than point probabilities. Before jumping into technical details let us give an initial small example.
Within some medical domain ~ consider a piece of knowledge borrowed from an example in [4] : "Metastatic cancer is a possible cause of a brain tumor, which in turn is possibly associated with severe headaches."
A sample causal program, where A v~ v2> B denotes an uncertain rule Thus metastatic cancer occurs in 20% to 25% of all patients, and brain tumor is caused by metastatic cancer in 20% to 30% of all cases, whereas it has some other cause in 1% to 10%. The brain tumor itself is a cause for severe headaches in 80% to 90% of all cases, but if it is not present, severe headaches occur in 50% to 60%.
Syntax of Causal Programs
As usual in first-order logic, we start with a short description of the alphabet of the probabilistic language. The alphabet consists of numeric constants (like ".75"), predicate symbols (like "A" and "f~"), connectives (hke , The following definition of rules corresponds to the definition of formulas in first-order logic. However, instead of forming strings of symbols of the alphabet, we prefer a two-dimensional notation. For instance, instead of A ~ Bu we write A u , B, since the latter representation is more convenient. l Probabilities are usually real-valued. But the real numbers are not countably infinite, and therefore we cannot use them for a formal system. For our purpose, however, it is sufficient to consider the rational numbers in U = [0, 1], which are countably infinite.
• A *--9 _ B is called a likelihood rule.
• ( A, B, C) is called an independence rule.
An uncertain rule of the form 12 u , A is called an 12-rule. The justification of the names for the different rule types will be clear as soon as we give the semantics below. As will be explained later, the restrictions syntactically guarantee that we can work with closed intervals. In the sequel all rules are assumed to be restricted.
u In this article for simplicity we consider queries where the predicates are ? not negated. A query A , B, which is posed to a causal program 9 is understood as a request to find the tightest probability interval for the conclusion B under the total evidence A.
Semantics of Causal Programs
We define a probabilistic interpretation to attach a meaning to the rules of a causal program.
DEFIMTION 2.5 (Probabilistic interpretation)
A probabilistic interpretation J is a triple (1~, J, P), where:
• 1~ is a nonempty set, called the domain of discourse.
• J is an interpretation function which assigns to every predicate a subset of 1~.
• P : f~ ---, U is a probability measure.
For a given predicate A and an interpretation function J, we call J(A) an instance of A. In our set-theoretic view the instances J(A 1) ..... J(A n) of the predicates A 1 ..... A n, respectively, are considered as elements in a least o--algebra sO. Thus we have a probability space (fl, .~g, P). Therefore, the interpretations of (basic) predicates are also called (basic) events. In the sequel we shall repeatedly write P(A) as a shorthand for P(J(A)). • I~(A, B,C)i,.: iff P(B) = 0 or P(AC I B) = P(A I B).P(C I B), which will be denoted by I( A, B, C ). We say ..7 satisfies a rule r if Er~.7 holds.
U
The intended meaning of an uncertain rule A --* B is as follows: The probability for an event B, given an event A, falls within the range u. The interval u is called the belief (or belief range) of the conclusion B under the premise A.
Some additional remarks are in order here about the restrictions for the rules. These restrictions guarantee that we can work with closed intervals (i.e., all values within the specified boundaries are indeed possible for a suitable interpretation): We place a uniform probability distribution over the given domain, by defining An important model-theoretic concept is that of consequences. Let 3 be a set of rules, and let r be a rule. We say r is a consequence of ~2, written ~2 ~ r, if for every interpretation Jr, "J is a model for ~" implies "J is a model for r."
In Example 2.7, e.g., If r has weaker hounds, then r is also satisfied. However, we are only interested in those consequences which have precise (tightest) bounds. Precision is very important from the point of view of reliability: Probabilistic inferences must be accurate for making decisions under uncertainty and for detecting gaps in the knowledge base. Based on the semantics of rules, we define the semantics of a causal program w.r.t, a causal polytree, where independencies are assumed implicitly as in Bayesian networks [18] .
DEFINITION 2.9 (Bayesian model) Let 9 be a causal program w.r.t, a causal tree ~ = (V, E). A probabilistic interpretation J= ( f~, J, P) is called a Bayesian model of ~ if J is a model of 9 and ~ is a Bayesian network w.r.t. P.
A consequence of this definition is that all Bayesian models of a causal program ~ satisfy the same set of independence rules. These independencies can be identified by cutset separation in the corresponding causal tree ,~ of 3. The proof of Lemma 2.10 follows from the existence of a Bayesian model for Bayesian networks (cf. [18] ) and can be found in [28] .
Based on the meaning of a Bayesian model, we can characterize the intended answer to a probabilistic query. 
t. (~, d?) if A u , B is a precise Bayesian consequence of ~.
Now how can we compute precise Bayesian answers? The key to the solution is to define logical inference rules, i.e. bounds propagation methods, which can incrementally combine a few rules into new rules guaranteeing precision.
BOUNDS PROPAGATION IN TREES
A naive approach to deriving precise bounds for causal programs is to apply the standard Bayesian methods for each combination of probability bounds, and finally to minimize and maximize the results. This approach, however, suffers from combinatorial explosion. But Bayesian networks constitute not only a Bayesian model of a domain but also a computational architecture for reasoning about uncertain knowledge. At each node of the network the belief is computed by fusing causal with diagnostic information. ~r-messages (causal support) are propagated in the forward direction; A-messages (diagnostic support) are propagated in the backward direction [18] .
Propagation of Probabilities
We adopt this inference mechanism for causal programs with Bayesian models where probability intervals are used instead of point probabilities. We will represent a 7r-message by a suitable uncertain rule and a Amessage by a suitable likelihood rule. New local computation methods are developed for propagating and fusing this information. The bounds computation itself is based on the following functions. •
In principle, f, f, and f could be defined over real numbers, but the interesting properties of these functions hold for the restriction to tuples over U. Some elementary properties of these functions are given in the following lemma. 
Proof (a): min(u,~,y)~u×x×y f(u, x, y) = min~, ux a + (1 -u)y I = minus. U(Xl -Yl) + Yl =f(u, xl,Yl). Analogously, we get the maximum of f.
(b), (c) follow from the definition of f.
•
The bounds propagation methods below make use of the precise consequence operator ~ , requiring an explicit listing of all relevant precise information in its premise. Therefore, implicitly assumed conditional independencies are made explicit now. 
From (A,B,C) we get P(AC IB) = P(A I B).P(CIB). Therefore

P(B) P(BC IA) = --.P(ACIB) = P(B IA) " P(C I B) = u'x. P(A)
Analogously, because of ( A, B, C) we get
P(BC I A) ---P(B I A).P(C I B) = (1 -u) .y.
Hence P(C IA) = u . x + (1 -u).y = f(u, x, y) = z, i.e., J satisfies A Z,C. 
• Theorem 3.4 allows us to propagate the influence of an evidence A on a node B to a node C which is a child of B in the causal tree (forward propagation). For A = D, we propagate bounds on absolute probabilities (i.e. background knowlege) instead of bounds on conditional probabilities. Theorem 3.4 provides us with a first inference rule PP. Application of this and similar rules will be denoted by the deduction operator "~-", in particular " t-". In general we shall suppress the independence assumpee tions among the premises of the inference rule for notational convenience.
To illustrate the forward propagation we refer to Example 2.7, where D is assumed to represent the patients in a given clinic:
. 20 Thus in the given clinic the absolute probability of having a brain tumor lies between 5% and 15%, whereas the probability of having severe headaches is in the range of 51% to 65%. In both cases, the resulting intervals are not much broader than the input intervals. Later we will see examples where the intervals tend to diffuse. For (u, v, a) ~ U X U × Q and ~a = (a 1, a2), we conclude from Lemma 3.2(c) that f(u, a 1, a 2) = f(v, al, a 2) = 0 iff (u, u, a) ~ {tl, t2}. Therefore, the function g is not defined for the tuples t 1 and t 2. The constraints for the definitions of ~ and g are analogous.
Propagation of Likelihoods
LEMMA 3.6 (Properties of g and g) 
Fusion of Probabilities and Likelihoods
Finally we describe how causal and diagnostic evidence are combined properly. • Theorem 3.12 allows us to fuse the influence of a causal evidence A on a node B with the influence of a diagnostic evidence C on B, and we get the belief in B. The condition (u, a) ~ D h is necessary and sufficient to guarantee P(AC) > 0 for all models of ~,~. In cases where P(AC) may become 0, P(BIAC) is not defined; hence no belief in B can be computed. This problem may even occur in Bayesian networks with point probabilities. It can be circumvented by disallowing the extreme probabilities 0 and 1.
Let us apply Theorem 3.12 to Example 2.7. Knowing that a patient has severe headaches, we are interested in the belief that he has a brain tumor or a metastatic cancer: The belief in a brain tumor lies between 6% and 24%, while the belief in a metastatic cancer is in the range from 21% to 29%. Compared to the situation before knowing the severe headaches, i.e. f~ .05 .15 Tumor and f~ .20.25 Cancer, the above beliefs have increased, but there is not enough evidence that the patient has the tumor or the cancer.
The propagation of the influence of an evidence through a tree is very similar to that through a chain. Probability bounds are propagated from each node to its children, and likelihood bounds are propagated from each node to its parent. Proof Follows from Lemma 3.13 and the monotonicity and continuity of "."
The effect of two diagnostic evidences A and C on a node B is fused by simply multiplying the corresponding likelihood bounds. Even in the case where a node has more than two children, the resulting likelihood bounds are a product of the given bounds. This follows directly from the fact that, for a given node B, two disjoint subsets of children of B are conditionally independent.
SOUNDNESS, COMPLETENESS AND EFFICIENCY
Now we present the derivation of answers to a query based on the inference rules given in the previous section. We show that these inference rules are sound and complete for causal trees. (The extension to polytrees will be treated in Section 6.)
Soundness and Completeness Theorem
For the purpose of computing an answer--with implicit independence assumptions--we introduce the following rules.
DEFINITION 4.1 @r-Rule and A-rule) Let B be a basic predicate, and A, C be conjunctive predicates. Let u ~ U and a ~ Q.
• A >c B is called a ~--rule.
• B c*--~ -A is called a A-rule.
Let J be a probabilistic interpretation.
• 
DEFINITION 4.2 (Causal derivation) Let ~ be a causal program w.r.t, a causal tree. Let ~ be a query with a set ~ of evidences. A causal derivation w.r.t. (~, ~) is a sequence of 7r-and A-rules generated from and ~ by applying the following inference rules:
• Initialization:
B~-BB*---:-B.
IL
• Propagation of probability and likelihood bounds: 
A--~B, BD~ --a C,A mD, c=g(u,v,a) F-AB~ :-C.
v PL
• Fusion of probability and likelihood bounds:
A u a
> DB, BE* -:-C, D77E,(u,a)~Dh, z = h(u,a)
~-AC 
FLL
In general, given a causal derivation, the boundary consists of parents and children of the head. (In some special cases, the head occurs in the boundary.) The boundary allows us to keep track of the influences on the head, so that an evidence is not counted twice and so that an influence is not fed back to its origin: Given a rule a, the joint influence of the evidences from t~ on the head h a is propagated only to those parents and children of h,~ which are outside b~; this prevents the feedback of influences. On the other hand, two rules are fusioned if their boundaries are disjoint; this prevents us from counting evidences twice. 
t. ( ~, ~ ) if there is a causal derivation w.r.t. (9, ~ ) g such that the last rule in the sequence is A > c B for some C.
Some examples for causal derivations have already been given in Section 3. (Subscribed predicates were omitted there, but they could easily be provided.)
Let us consider the situation at node C in Figure 2 . We have an influence of a causal evidence A on C, and influences of two diagnostic evidences E and G on C.
A " >BC, CD~-:--E,
and CF~:--G are assumed to be precise Bayesian consequences of the given tree ~. By applying the methods for fusion and propagation, we get again precise Bayesian consequences of ~.
• Fusion of probability and likelihood bounds: • Propagation of probability and likelihood bounds:
A >BC, CD~--:--E ~-AE >BD C,
FPL
A >BC, CF~:--GI--AG >BF C, FPL
CD~--: --E, CF~--: -G t-CDF ~-: --EG,
FLL
A >BC, CDF ~--: --EG F-AEG >BDF C.
• .
pp
B > ) C,CDF ~'" : --EG ~-Bc~-: -EG.
• "
PL
This leads us to the following theorem.
THEOREM 4.4 (Soundness and completeness of causal derivations) Let be a causal program w.r.t, a causal tree, and let ~ = A > B. Then every computed answer w.r.t. (~, ~) is precise Bayesian, and every precise Bayesian answer w.r.t. (~, ~) can be computed.
Proof (sketch)
Soundness:
Every computed answer is precise Bayesian.
• Consequence:
Let S be a Bayesian model for ~. Obviously, J satisfies every rule derived by IP or IL. The independence rules in a causal graph and Theorem 3.4, 3.8, 3.12, and 3.14 imply that each application of PP, PL, FPL, and FLL, respectively, yields a Bayesian consequence of ~.
• Precision: Let A > B be a derived rule with an interval z, and let z ~ z. It can be shown that there is a Bayesian model for and the specialization A z > B (cf. [28] ).
2.
Completeness: Every precise Bayesian answer can be computed. Let A > B be a precise Bayesian answer. Then it can be shown Z that there is a derivation of a rule c~ = A > c B, where C consists of all parents of B and the minimal set of children of B such that A and B are separated by C (cf. [28] ). Consequently, the computed bounds for are precise.
Efficiency of Bounds Propagation
Finally, let us consider the complexity of computing an answer to a query: Let m be the number of evidences, and let n be the number of vertices in a causal graph.
The effort to fuse m evidences is linear in m, and the effort to propagate an evidence through the graph is linear in n. Therefore, the computational effort of computing an answer is O(m + n). More precisely, since m < n, the complexity is O(n).
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
As already mentioned in the introduction, one of the reasons to study intervals of probabilities instead of point probabilities is the need for sensitivity analysis. Therefore, now we want to analyze the extent to which imprecisions in the input probabilities affect the derived conclusions. To measure this effect, let us consider a Bayesian network with point probabilities and a corresponding causal program with probability intervals of various degrees of imprecision. EXAMPLE 5.1 (Sunburn) [17] Suppose it is Saturday and you work in a windowless office. You look forward to going to a baseball game later. If it rains, there is a 95% chance that the game will be canceled, and otherwise it is certain that the game will be played. You assume that it is cloudy 10% of the time. Clouds cause rain 60% of the time, and rain cannot occur if clouds are absent.
Question 1:
Will the game be rained out?
Now suppose a somewhat unreliable rain alarm sounds in your office and you wish to determine a revised probability of rain. Experience with the alarm tells your that the probability of the alarm sounding when there is rain is 0.8, but 4% of the time the alarm will sound falsely.
Question 2:
How are the chances for the game now?
Later that afternoon your son calls you on the telephone. He is reluctant to discuss the weather, but insists on spending the night with his nearby aunt. After consenting, you muse over the conversation, remembering that he tends to visit her only when he has something to hide. You know that he is at the local beach. If it is sunny (not cloudy), it is 70% probable he will get a sunburn, but if it is cloudy, there is only a 10% chance that he will get a sunburn. You estimate that he would certainly visit his aunt if he is sunburned, while the probability that he would visit here otherwise is only 2%.
Question 3: How does this new event affect the ball game?
According to [17] , the following results can be derived in a Bayesian network: The answer to Question 1 is that the game will be played with a belief of 94%. In the situation of Question 2, the chances for the game are reduced to a belief of 47%. The answer to Question 3 is that the game becomes more probable again with a belief of 83%.
Instead of deriving the same results, we want to analyze the sensitivity of the above conclusions when the input is not exact. We assume that each probability has an imprecision of +2%. (This is an absolute imprecision. The sensitivity can also be measured by a relative imprecision. A scenario with different imprecisions will be given at the end of this section.) Cases with an extreme probability of 0 or of 1 are naturally interpreted as taxonomic knowledge (cf. [10] ). Considering impreeisions (called blurring subsequently) would model exceptions to a generic taxonomical rule (cf. [19] ). The full scenario is depicted in Figure 3 .
I PP
In absence of any evidence, only the influence of the background knowledge 12 is propagated to node G. The belief is very high that the baseball game will be played: it is between 89% and 96%. For the given imprecision, this result is relatively insensitive. ? Question 2: A ) G: .08 .12 -
.78 .82 .
R .o--~.o6 A , R "°3-~ G, S ~ p.
. Upon receipt of the evidence A, the chances for the game are reduced: they are now between 21% and 64%. Obviously, the situation is highly sensitive; the bounds tend to diffuse, which means that the results of the point probability analysis should be taken with a grain of salt. 
AP )AcR, R ) , Gt-AP )R G.
.
1 PP
The second revision takes into account the influences of A and P on G. The new belief is between 39% and 94%. Thus in general it is higher than the previous one. This belief revision reveals a very high sensitivity as indicated by wide bounds.
The deductions here did not employ method FLL. The point is that this method is only required when several diagnostic supports arrive at a node. 
FPL
The belief in the presence of clouds is between 6% and 44%. The reason for the wide bounds is again the existence of opposing evidences A and P.
(Again the point probability analysis yields a very precise answer, namely 19%, but of limited trustworthiness.) The rain alarm is an explanation for the presence of clouds, whereas the phone call of the probably sunburned son is an explanation for the absence of clouds. The belief in the absence of clouds is preferred, since the effect of the sunburn evidence is greater than that of the somewhat unreliable rain alarm. Table 1 shows the results for Example 5.1 in dependence of an absolute imprecision and the blurring of extreme probabilities. The computation of the bounds in the last column was discussed above. We can observe several widening bounds, even if we choose an imprecision of _+1% and without blurring the extreme probabilities 0 and 1. Thus in the light of opposing evidences some bounds tend to diffuse toward the unit interval because of an increased sensitivity.
In fact, such behavior might turn into a killer argument against the use of Bayesian networks for decision analysis in general. Employing our approach with a sound, complete, and efficient inference method for probability intervals can now come as a remedy. A sensitivity analysis as demonstrated above can detect such undesirable behavior. By a systematic investigation we can identify those sensitive portions of the network that are prone to chaotic behavior. This knowledge can then be taken as an educated guess, where one might wish to change or refine to chosen network. Eventually, after some iterations of this scenario, the network design should become much more robust and reliable for decision-analysis applications (e.g. influence diagrams) implemented on top of it.
BOUNDS PROPAGATION IN POLYTREES
We extend the previous result for causal trees to polytrees where each node may have at most two parents and thus multiple roots may occur.
Propagation of Probabilities
Compared to causal trees, polytrees offer the possibility to model multiple causes for an event. For instance, E may be caused by B or D or both. To describe the interaction among the causes, when we are concerned with uncertain and incomplete information, we use the causal rule with two causes:
B.D~E.
This rule describes the joint effect of two causes, B and D, on an event E and their interactions. For instance, B may weakly support E, but BD can be a strong support for E--then the bounds of s are less than the bounds of r; in particular s 2 < r r Extreme probabilities such as 0 and 1 are allowed; see the range restrictions in Definition 2.2. We may even imagine a logical circuit represented by a set of causal rules. Then, our methods can not only determine the functional result of the circuit but also be applied for a fault diagnosis in case of a malfunction, involving forward and backward inference.
Since we have multiple causes, there are multiple roots and multiple causal influences on an event: Each root depends on a priori (background) knowledge which involves a causal influence. 
~q~= A u >B,C v >D,B.D~E,(AC, BD, E), (AC, BD, E), (AC, BD, E), (AC, BD, E), (B, AC, D), (B,A,C), (D,C,A), (A,I~,C) and z = k(u, v, r, s, x, y). Then ~9~ ~ A C z > E.
precise Proof See [28] .
THEOREM 6.3 [Propagation of probability bounds (PP2)] Let ,9~= A U>B,C v >D,B.D~E,(AC, BD, E), (AC, BD, E>, (AC, BD, E), <AC, BD, E>, (B, AC, D), (B, A,C), (D,C, A), (A, 11,C)}
and z = k(u, v, r, s, x, y). Then
~' ~ AC z > E.
precise Proof Follows from I_emma 6.2 and the properties of k and k.
• Theorem 6.3 allows us to propagate the influences of A on B and C on D to E, which is the child of B and D in the causal graph. This propagation becomes more complex if we have more then two direct causes of E. If the number of direct causes is n, we would require a causal rule with 2 n entries of bounds, so the computational complexity becomes exponential, too. Bayesian networks with point probabilities have the same problem. There it is suggested to categorize the interaction among clusters into prototypical structures, e.g. the so-called noisy OR gates and noisy AND gates, if additional assumptions like accountability or exception independence [18] can be made. The generalization of noisy OR gates and noisy AND gates to cope with intervals is similar to the above studies and is therefore omitted here. Thus we only show the bounds propagation through a causal graph where an event has at most two causes. (An illustrating example will be given later on in Section 6.4.)
Propagation of Likelihoods
To propagate the influence of a diagnostic evidence through the branches of a polytree in the backward direction, we need an additional propagation method for likelihoods. • / (v, r, s, x, y, a) := g(f(v, r, s), f(v, x, y) , a).
• l (c, a, fl, y, 6, a) :=/(v, ai, fli, Yi, 6i, a) , where i = 1 if a > 1, and otherwise i = 2, for a, fl, y, 6 ~ U 2.
• I(v, r, s, x,y, a)
where L = {vl, v 2} )< {al, a2}.
The constraints for l and ! are derived from the constraints for g and g.
LEMMA 6.5 (Propagation of likelihoods) Let Proof Follows from Lemma 6.5 and the properties of l and i.
• ~= C ~' ,D,B.D-~E,E*--'~-F,(BCD, E,F), (BCD, ff~, F), (C, BD, E), (C, BD, E), (CD, f~, B)}
If on the one hand we know the influence of the causal evidence C on D which is a potential cause for E, and on the other hand the influence of the diagnostic evidence F on E, then we can combine them properly and propagate their support to B which is another cause of E. 
Soundness, Completeness, and Efficiency
Bounds propagation for causal programs w.r.t, a causal polytree can use all causal derivation rules as stated in Definition 4.2. In addition the following derivation rules are required. 
PL2'
We derive c-rules by inference rules IP, FPL, PP, and PP2, while A-rules are derived by IL, FLL, PL, PL2, and PL2'. Inference rule S symmetrizes a causal rule with two causes, and PL2' is a specialization of PL2. The proof of Theorem 6.8 is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.4. Concerning efficient query answering the same results as for causal trees apply; i.e., query answering for polytrees is of linear complexity, too.
Sensitivity Analysis
In addition to the phenomena in Example 5.1 let us study an example for the interaction of multiple causes and the application of PP2 and PL2, with special emphasis on sensitivity phenomena. EXAMPLE 6.9 (Burglary; cf. [18] ) Imagine Mr. Holmes receives a phone call at work from his neighbor Dr. Watson, who states that he hears an alarm from the direction of Mr. Holme's house. Mr. Holmes assumes that a burglary is the cause of the alarm. As he is preparing to leave his office, he recalls that his daughter is scheduled to arrive home any minute. If greeted by an alarm sound, she probably would phone him for instructions. After waiting some minutes he decides to rush home. In his car he turns 2 Note that it is not necessary ~ describe all dependencies by causal rules. Likelihood rules can be used as well, as e.g. A g-:--: v_ W, which says that the likelihood of the alarm--coming from Mr. Holmes' house--is between 50 : 1 and 60 : 1. Then we have virtual evidence for the alarm. on his radio and hears the news that an earthquake has occurred. Mr. Holmes remembers reading in the instruction manual of his alarm system that the device is sensitive to earthquakes and can be accidentally triggered by one. So he reduces his initial belief in the burglary hypothesis, since the earthquake explains away the burglary as a cause for the alarm.
A specification of this story is depicted in Figure 4 . Note that this time we start out with intervals instead of exact probabilities. Dr. Watson's testimony seems to be very reliable, but it is not absolutely certain that the alarm comes from Mr. Holme's house. So we try to estimate this information by the rule A .5o.60 W" 2 The house is supposed to be in an environ-.01 .01 ment where earthquakes can be expected, e.g. in California. Further, we assume that there are two or three earthquakes within a decade, that is, the odds for an earthquake are between 26 and 36 (6 = 1/(365 x 10)) on a particular day. According to the crime statistics, a burglary is attempted only once or twice within a decade. The alarm system is judged to be very safe: An alarm is triggered by a burglary in more than 95% of all cases, but not always. A false alarm is produced at least once within three years, so we assume that the chances are between 0.1% and 0.2%. An earthquake have the usual form of a causal rule and should be self-explanatory. At this point, we add a remark about the independence assumptions. The earthquake and burglary hypothesis are unconditionally independent. However, knowledge about the alarm status, e.g. Watson's testimony, induces a dependency between these hypothesis. If we know that the alarm has occurred to a certain extent, the evidence for one hypothesis is an indirect evidence against the other (explaining away).
There are two evidences: Dr. Watson's testimony and the radio report with the earthquake announcement. First, we consider the situation imme- 
FPL
The belief in a burglary is reduced now, and much more credit is added to the earthquake hypothesis, that is, it explains away the other hypothesis. This phenomenon can be observed when we have multiple causes and different contexts. In the first situation, only the evidence W was relevant, whereas then two evidences R and W were considered. Now--after having done this analysis with available probability intervals --let us face the sensitivity issue. To this end we investigate what effect exact probabilities, if available, would have.
The test we perform consists in choosing (hypothetical) exact probabilities, which are taken to be the middle of each interval in question. Finally let us remark that in [28] multiply connected causal graphs are also investigated. For Bayesian networks, this task is known to be NPcomplete, and it must also be NP-complete for the corresponding causal programs, since they even allow probability intervals instead of point probabilities.
RELATED WORK
Influence Diagrams
In [5] two transformations for node removal and arc reversal in interval influence diagrams are presented. Basically, influence diagrams were developed for decision analysis--they can be viewed as a special type of Bayesian network where node removal corresponds to conditional expectation and arc removal corresponds to Bayesian conditioning. Instead of point probabilities, the authors investigated the use of intervals in influence diagrams, whence the name. However, as described there, successive transformations will result in weaker bounds.
Probability Assessment
In contrast to [14] , we do not relay on computing partial derivatives of the target values w.r.t, each of the model parameters; in that way one would get "information only about changes in a small neighborhood of the assessed values" [14] . Instead we vary the model parameters simultaneously within the given bounds.
Interval Probability Propagation
Tessem [24] has investigated the problem of propagating bounds through a singly connected Bayesian network with multivaried variables, and he has provided algorithms which lead to approximate results. His approach is more general than ours, since he considers variables with multiple outcomes and we have restricted our studies to binary variables. However, his approach fails to compute precise bounds, even in the case of binary variables. Let ;~(c)
Suppose that A is a causal evidence for C and that E is a diagnostic evidence for C. Then the influences and the belief in C are
or(C) = P(C I A),
A(C) = P(E I C),
Bel(C) = P(CIAE).
or and A messages are propagated in the forward and backward directions, respectively. The belief is the product of or, A, and a normalizing constant a [18] :
or(C) = or(B) . P(C I B) + or(B) . P(C I B),
A(C) = P(D I C). A(D) + P(D I C). A(D),
Bel ( The formulas for upper bounds are similar; we just have to exchange the lower and upper asterisks. This result is identical to that given in [24] .
However, the derived bounds are not precise, as can be seen in the following example. The problem here is that the derived likelihood ratio A,(Cancer): A*(Cancer) is not within the admissible region for A(Cancer): A(Cancer); see also Figure 1 and the associated discussion. Therefore [24] can only derive sound consequences, which are not precise in general.
Nevertheless the methods in [24] seem to be appropriate when we have to deal with variables with multiple outcomes. In these cases, precise bounds computation becomes impractical, since we have to deal with nonconvex sets, as stated there.
Confidence Intervals
Spiegelhalter in [22] discusses two approaches to model "imprecise" probabilities due to limited knowlege. In this first approach he attaches a standard deviation to the given probabilities, but only mentions the problem how to propagate these confidence intervals through the network. In our approach we don't consider confidence intervals, but rather assume that the probability lies within the specified interval with certainty. This assumption is justified if one chooses the interval large enough or if one considers successively larger intervals to get sensitivity results, and it allows us to solve the propagation problem. In his second approach Spiegelhalter represents the doubt about a conditional probability explicitly by creating a new event in the network, whose outcome decides the value of the uncertain conditional probability. This second approach is further elaborated in [23] .
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We have presented an extension of Bayesian networks to probability intervals, overcoming one crucial objection against Bayesian inference. Our logical approach to Bayesian modeling and inference admits both objective and subjective interpretations of probability. Key patterns of human reasoning, such as abduction and explaining away, can be modeled under imprecise probabilisitic information. The computational effort of our local bounds propagation methods is proportional to that in conventional Bayesian networks with exact probabilities. An important feature of our approach is the ability to perform systematic sensitivity analyses. Because an indispensible prerequisite for this is the completeness of the inference process, we provided a provably sound and complete set of local inference rules which always computes tightest intervals. The results of a sensitivity analysis can be employed to figure out chaotic portions of the Bayesian network, i.e. to unveil those situations where small changes in the input probabilities cause large effects on computed output intervals. Such behavior is, e.g., characteristic of opposing evidences. By careful remodeling of the Bayesian network a more robust and reliable conceptual model of the application domain can be accomplished, rendering decisionanalysis tools built on top more trustworthy.
The strictly logical approach to probabilistic modeling and inference we have adopted here has another important benefit. As shown in [10] and [16] , probabilistic reasoning can be intergrated into object-oriented database modeling, and its implementation can be realized through deductive database optimization techniques [11] . In this way we see a good chance to make Bayesian methods and other uncertainty reasoning approaches (like correlation programs [26] ) available for information systems with uncertain knowledge in a commercial product delivery environment.
